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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------
l·!R:O 11.lkHJ\N FOSTER and JOHN 
r.WTN 1 ,, nat11rdl parents of 
Jeffrey \drian Ewing, aka Jeff-
rey Foster, Deceased, a 
minor, and DAVID MAC KELLY, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body cor-
porate and politic of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 19051 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs' claim of recovery in this case is based upon 
the theory that Salt Lake County is an "implied insurer" of employees 
driving Salt Lake County vehicles even though not within the course 
and scope of their employment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court held that the defendant was indebted to 
"'ldinl, tt; ui the amount of $15,000 plus costs, attorney's fees and 
·'"I 1nlPrest 011 $150,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment entered by the 
I I l,l I \'l>lll t. 
STATEMENT or FACTS 
All statutorv , el.ere'n<' lo the Utah Code Annotd1 
1953. 
Prior to July l, 1(]77, .':>alt L,ike County's vehicles we 
insured by a commercial insurance company. On June 13, 1977, t· 
Salt Lake County Commission voted to investigate a self-insurn 
program. On June 27, Salt Lake County applied to the Insurance 
Commissioner for a Certificate of Self-Insurance pursuant to th 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act (Record p.138). The Certific 
of Self-Insurance was issued on the 7th of July, 1977 (Recordp 
Consequently, the commercial insurance was not renewed at thee· 
piration of the policy period. 
On January 26, 1978, Deputy Sheriff David Mac 
off-duty at 4:00 p m. At approximately 11:00 p.m., while drivr 
a Salt Lake County vehicle under the influence of alcohol, 
Kelly collided with a pedestrian, Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, plaint; 
sixteen-year-old son, and Deputy Kelly fled the scene of them 
dent. Jeffrey Ewing died as a result of the injuries received 
Deputy Kelly was terminated from the Sheriff's Deparc 
and convicted of automoblle homicide and leaving the scene ofi 
accident (Record Exh. D-15). Jeffrey Ewing's parents filed a 
wrongful death action against Deputy Kelly, former Sheriff Delc 
Larson, Sheriff Rex L. Vance and Salt Lake County (Civil Case 
No. C-78-1377). Kelly conL1r t2d h1s private insurance carrier 
sent a letter to the Salt l.ake County Conuni ssion, with a copy· 
the Summons and Complaint, stating, "it would appear that your 
surance applies" (Record p. ;1,). 
On Mar 1 h 23, 1978, the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
l11l 1n,,d to rq.ire:ot'nt Mr. Kelly for Mr. Kelly's failure to comply 
. '111 11" Tndemni fication of Public Officers and Employees Act 
: 1Jhi-'1X-l el seq.) (Record p.93). 
On January 4, 1979, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed 
<letend;ints Larson, Vance and Salt Lake County from the lawsuit 
(Record p.208). Salt Lake County did not know at the time of the 
dismissal that Kelly had secretly entered into an agreement with 
plaintiffs whereby he agreed not to contest his negligence in caus-
ing the death of Jeffrey Ewing. Kelly also agreed, as a part of 
this secret arrangement, to assign any cause of action he may have 
had against Salt Lake County to Foster and Ewing, and they, in turn, 
agreed not to execute against Kelly's personal assets (Record p.12-16). 
On January 5, 1979, the day following the voluntary dis-
missal, plaintiffs presented their evidence in an uncontested trial 
before Third District Court Judge David K. Winder. Salt Lake County 
was not informed of this hearing and, of course, was not present. 
Judge Winder awarded a judgment against Kelly in the amount of 
;;150,000.00. 
Plaintiffs then filed this action against Salt Lake County 
seeking a judgment declaring Salt Lake County to be liable to the 
plc1intiffs in Lhe amount of $100,000.00. 
The case was set for a jury trial on June 28, 1979. The 
11 1 1l did not proceed as scheduled. Rather, Judge James S. Sawaya 
h· ,, I , i·1 .. 1 ion for Summary Judgment on the pleadings at that time. 
fl,. 2r.1ntPd .Judgmenl against Salt Lake County in the amount of 
·ll, (J(Jl) 00 (even though the Complaint only prayed for $100, 000. 00) · 
-3-
This Court ',_,,,_,, s:·d 111. · nler gi·anting suIIllilary judgme1 
in Foster v. Salt__ !.1l P.2d 810 (1981) and r-
the case for trial ( I-<'"''""1 [· I 
The tr:ui 1 was he: LJ <>n ,)eptc-:111ber 13, 1982, before the 
Honorable David B. Dee, Ll1s[rirt Judge, without a jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EXTENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY'S LIABILITY AS A "SELF-
INSURER" IS LIMITED TO PAYMENT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS. 
A. of Utah Automobile No-Fault provis 
Prior to the adoption of the Utah Automobile No-Fault 
surance Act in 1973, public entities were not required to carry 
public liability insurance. Section 41-12-33 specifically exem 
the 0n.ted States, lhe State of Utah, or any of its 
divisions, from the provisions of the Safety Responsibility 
In 1973, however, the Legislature adopted the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Act, Section 31-41-1, et seq., which provide 
in part as follows: 
The State of Utah and all of its political sub-
divisions and their respective departments, in-
stitutions, or agencies shall maintain in effect 
continuously in respect to their motor vehicles, 
the security provided for in Section 31-41-5. 
The provisions of Section 31-41-5 provide two mutuall 
exclusive alternative methods wherel:,y the required security car 
provided. Subsection (a1 ;iutl11JrLzes security to be provided tr 
an automobile insurance pol icy which qualifies under the Safen 
Responsibility Act. Subsection (b) permits security to be pro1 
"by any other method aµproved by t lw Department (of Insurance) 
affording security Pquivalent t<; thcit offered by a policy of i: 
1, 
cinrc Th,;t subsection also states that the "person providing this 
1 YI,,_, <>I ,;ecurity shall have all of the obligations and rights of an 
un<:i_e_i::_ __ t_l:'._is act," i.e., the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
.-1,-' "t l Yrl (emphasis added). 
In this case, Salt Lake County provided security through 
the means of an annual tax levy from which judgments against the 
County could be paid. The Insurance Commissioner is empowered to 
issue a Certificate of Self-Insurance when he finds that an appli-
cant qualifies under Section 31-41-5. On July 1, 1977, a Certifi-
cate of Self-Insurance was issued to Salt Lake County by the Insur-
ance Department of the State of Utah (Record p.140). The Certifi-
cate in pertinent part states as follows: 
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that pursuant to the In-
surance Code of the State of Utah, Salt Lake 
County has complied with Section 31-41-5(l)(b) 
of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Law 
and has qualified as a self-insurer." 
In order to determine the obligations of the self-insurance 
which Salt Lake County assumed, it is necessary to refer to the No-
Fault Insurance Act. The limits of liability to the County are as 
set forth in the No-Fault Act which provides in detail the extent 
of benefits to which an injured party may be entitled. By thus de-
fining the benefits, the limits of liability applicable to the 
publi< entity are clearly established. 
fhe method for providing security as approved by the In-
Cummi ssioner, i.e., the levy of taxes for the payment of 
i''d;.;rn<-r1to, artd the establishment of coverage as provided in the No-
' "' l L J nsurance Act were properly found by the Insurance Commissioner 
1 ,, , •111stit ut.e a substantially equivalent security. Neither the 
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adequacy of the security n<ir !·fi, .1pproval by the Insurance ColllJL. 
sioner is challengen 
The duties of a selt-111surc1· uuder the No-Fault Act r 
clearly established. i\s puinte-d uut above, Section 31-41-5(11, 
provides that the party provid1ng the alternate type of securn 
" shall have a Ll of the obligations and rights of an insur· 
" under the No-Fault Act. The obligations of an insurer ur 
the Act, which constitute the terms of the policy, are set fort• 
in detail in Section 31-41-6 (a copy of that statute is 
the Appendix of this Brief). The language of the statute is si 
nificant: 
"(1) Every insurance policy or other securitt 
with the re uirements of Subsection 1 o 
Section I- - s a provi e persona injury pro-
tection providing for payments to the insured and 
all other persons suffering personal injury arising 
out of an accident involving a motor vehicle, except 
as otherwise provided in this Act, in at least the 
following minimum amounts." (emphasis added). 
Subsection (2) sets forth the manner in which 
expenses are to be determined and the remaining subsections fur 
clarify the application of the section. 
Thus the "other security" approved by the Insurance C. 
missioner as qualifying a governmental entity to become a self· 
insurer under the No-Fault Act requires the entity to undertake 
responsibilities of an insurer and become obligated to pay not 
to the insured but to "r11 J "' hPr pecsons suffering personal in1 
arising out of an accident invulv1ng a motor vehicle" owned by 
political subdivision, in "at least the minimum amounts", as SI' 
fied in that Act There is no dispute in this case that Salt: 
County has paid the nu-fault benefits to the plaintiffs 
hy this ."-<'t 
B. The trial court correct! held that the defendant 
is not an insurance carrier nor is t ere an insurance 
contract involved in this case. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges: 
"4. That under the provisions of the Utah Code Annotated 
and by action of the Salt Lake County Commission and specifically 
pursuant to the provisions of 63-30-1 through 34, the defendant is 
required to provide indemnity and insurance coverage to the judgment 
debtor, David Mac Kelly, in the sum of $100,000 plus interest, costs, 
and attorney's fees, and that plaintiffs are entitled to the proceeds 
of that contract of indemnity; 
5. That defendant is the automobile liability insurer 
of plaintiff, David Mac Kelly, and as such is indebted to all plain-
tiffs as alleged in paragraph 4 of this complaint; ... " (emphasis 
added). 
Prior to trial, plaintiffs' theory was that in order for 
the County to be liable, it was either the insurance carrier of 
plaintiff Kelly or bound by an insurance contract between the County 
and plaintiff Kelly. Plaintiffs' position was clearly represented 
to the trial court as follows: 
"MR. KIPP: If there isn't a contract of insurance, express 
.;r i_mp[1,_d by which they are bound, I don't win. 
fHE COURT: That's right. 
MR. KIPP: If there is, I win, presuming we meet the terms. 
1 l1.1l '"' \vhat this case is all about." (p.42 trial transcript) 
fhe trial court at page 2 of its Memorandum Decision stated 
-7-
that " ... no insurance policy is involved." It went on to hold-
County liable to the minimum l irn1 t :> ,,f Section 41-12-l(k) as a 
self-insurer. (Finding Ol fd< l rk l) I 
Plaintiffs' theory .,f ceCc)Very under a contract, expr 
or implied, was specifically re1ected by the trial court 
have been the key finding of fact in a judgment of no cause of 
The statute (31-41-S(b)) provides that a self-insurer 
has the obligations of an insurer under this act. "This act" i• 
the no-fault act. The obligations of an insurer under the act 
set out in Section 31-41-6 as payment of no-fault benefits. Tu 
that the County is a self-insurer under the Safety Responsibili 
Act would absolutely contradict Section 42-12-33 of that 
specifically states that the act does not apply to governmental 
entiti.c:s. 
C. Section 63-30-29. 5 and Allstate v. USF&G should 
retroactive application in this case. 
The trial court's decision is based upon a strainedc 
struction of the Supreme Court's holding in Allstate Insurance 
Utah 619 P.2d 329 (1980). The Allstate case holds 
an insurance policy which is used as security under the 
Act must comply with the "qualifications" of an insurance polic 
set forth in Section 41-12-21 of the Safety Responsibility Act-
Allstate case did not deal with security which the( 
has used to qualify as a self-insurer 
interesting tu thc1L the trial court casually brush< 
aside the defendant's uncontroverte<l case law dealing with se 
insurance from other jurisdictions cited in its Trial 
stating: "The statute does not refer to self-insurance so its 
argument in this regard i_s not germa1n." (Page 2 Memorandum 
Decision). - ' 
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This action was filed more than one year before this Court's 
de1 is ion in the: filstate case which explains why the plaintiffs never 
ra' t-he Allstate theory in their Complaint and never relied on 
that 1·cisP because it limits their recovery to the sum of $15,000.00. 
lhe Allstate case is not controlling because it applies 
to contracts of insurance used as security under the No-Fault Act 
and should not be retroactively applied in this case because 
(1) plaintiffs never relied upon it, and (2) the County had 
no statutory notice or guidance from this Court when the cause of 
action arose in 1978 that it could be held liable under the provi-
sions of the Safety Responsibility Act. 
The same rationale applies to the newly-enacted Section 
63-30-29.5 which extends coverage for permissive users to govern-
mental entities as of May, 1983. 
D. Self-insurers, in most other 'urisdictions, are not 
o igate un er ru es o exten e po icy situa-
tions such as permissive use. 
The District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, 
California, had a very similar factual situation in the case of 
Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, 51 Cal. Rptr. 
789 (1966), wherein that Court ably articulated the differences in-
volved in "self-insurance" settings. Although in the Glens Falls 
casP the defendant had obtained a certificate of self-insurance 
'·nder the California Safety Responsibility Act (and the County has 
• 1 1 ! r 11c:d one in this case only under the No-Fault Act), that Court 
-9-
"Defendant Consol id.lt:d 'c; not an insurance carrier. 
Nor does th1c. •.·ac;e tn1")l1•, ;my motor vehicle liability 
policy issHed 'llld "''1i c i mdj ng at the time of the acci-
dent. Consolidated 1:0 11wrely an authorized self-
insurer or, to put it 1nocc exa,·tly, a company to 
which the Moror Vehicle neµartment has issued a 
certificate of self insurance. Neither the Vehicle 
Code sections referring lo self-insurance (§§16055, 
16056) nor any other sections of said code contain 
any provisions that such certificate is or constitutes 
a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance or that 
said certificate shall be deemed to incorporate or 
embrace provisions required in such policies (§16451). 
Indeed the Vehicle Code nowhere intimates any connec-
tion between section 16451 and sections 16055, 16056. 
A certificate of self-insurance is not a motor vehicle 
liability policy of insurance. In a word, it is not an 
insurance policy at all and plaintiff has offered no 
authority that it is. As we previously explained, it 
is merelb one of the several methods provided by laW-
for esta lish1n exem tion from furnishin secur1t . 
Face wit t ese rea ities, G ens Fa s attempts to 
transmogrify the certificate of "self-insurance" by 
dropping the word "self", to assume that the resultant 
product is "insurance" and thereafter to engraft on 
such "insurance" all of the rules dealing with liability 
insurance. No authority, statutory or decisional, sup-
ports such a construction. 
The simple answer here is that this case does 
not involve the contractual obligations of an in-
surance company, Nor are any obligations or any 
rules of extended policy situations in any way 
imposed upon Consolidated." (emphasis added) 
The California Court thus held that the plaintiff's 
attempt to engraft standard form insurance provisions onto a "self 
insurer" program of risk retention was devoid of merit. It speci-
fically held at page 795 that: 
" ... [S]ection 16451 [the requirement of an omnibus 
coverage of permissive use1 s] dnes not create any 
independent legal J1abil1Ly trn the negligent opera-
tion of a motor 1•PhJ•. by a permissive user. As we 
have explained, th,Jt :;c•ction merely prescribes the 
necessary terms and provisions of an insurance 
policy furnished as 1->rnof 'lf ability to respond in 
damages and thus cnnstituting one of the several 
methods of establishing exemption from the require-
ment of depos1t1ng security to satisfy any final 
Judgment or Juclgm<>nts tor Lodily injury or property 
. 10 
damage (§16057). Indeed, the Automobile Financial 
Responsibility Law 'does not in so many words make 
mdndatory.the procuring of a liability insurance 
policy prior to the first accident and judgment***'" 
(Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., supra 
46 Cal. 2d 423, 436, 296 P.2d 801 808 57 A.L.R. 
2d 914.) ' ' 
The Court of Appeals of New York has similarly held that 
self-insurance is not "insurance" at all when dealing with financial 
responsibility acts. In Guercio v. Hertz Corp., 358 N.E.2d 261, 
264 (1976) that Court held: 
"Generally, self-insurance is no insurance at all. 
Rather, self-insurance in this context, is a con-
venient shorthand for describing the manner in which 
a class of vehicle owners may comply with the require-
ments of the Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act." 
" ... The crux of the matter is that a financially able 
fleet owner may avoid the necessity of obtaining lia-
bility insurance and paying insurance premiums. By 
undertaking to assure payment of judgments, the owner 
does not become an "insurer" of anything other than 
his own ability to pay for damages for which he is 
legally responsible. (citations omitted). In sum, 
self-insurance is not insurance but an assurance 
an assurance that judgments will be paid." 
The Court went on to conclude that absent a separate 
rentdl agreement between Hertz and the customer, liability for damages 
caused by permissive users would not arise simply because Hertz was 
a self-insurer. [Similar conclusions in Location Auto Leasing 
Cor.r_. v. Lembo Corp., 310 N.Y.S. 2d 365 (1970); Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 284 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (1967)]. 
The Texas Supreme Court has also followed the general 
addressed by the California and New York Courts 
1 ,1 .1 , c>rlificate of self-insurance does not constitute other 
« l 1 d dJtd collectable insurance within the meaning of an 
''l'"'t'1lo1-'s liability policy issued to an employee driving a self-
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insured employer's car with its permission on personal business at 
the time of the accidenc _ _!:1ome __ __ f_ompany v. Humble 01 
and Refining Co., 311'.i S.W.2d 861 (lP'' Cl.v. App. 1958); Allstate 
Insurance Company v. Zellars 4'.JJ S.\>/ 2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970 
affirmed by Supreme Court of Texas in l-162 S.W.2d 550, 552 [l] (197' 
Under California law, al 1 po lie ies of insurance issued ar 
certified in that state must include coverage for any permissive 
user of an insured motor vehicle. In a recent case, Western 
Insurance v. Es ta te of Taira (September 29, 1982) , California Court 
of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, that court dealt with a sur-
prisingly similar factual situation (except that the driver of 
state vehicle was within the course and scope of his employment). 
On January 23, 1978, two state parole agents, Eugene Taira, the 
driver, drJ Roy Longmire, passenger, were killed when a state-ownec 
1974 Plymouth driven by Taira collided with another vehicle. Then 
was evidence that both Taira and Longmire were under the influence 
of alcohol. Taira and Longmire were in the course and scope of 
their employment at the time of the accident and Taira was driving 
the 1974 Plymouth with permission of the owner and his employer, 
the State of California Subsequently, Longrnire's widow and childr 
brought an action for wrongful death against the estate of Taira 
an<l others under Labor Code Section :160l(a)(2), which permits suit 
against a fellow employee for injury or death resulting from intm 
cation. As a result of that action. Western Pioneer, the 
carrier for decedent driver, Taira, hrought an action for declarat 
relief to determine whether its policy of insurance covered Taira 
while he was driving a state car, and whether the state, a 
sel t insured owner of the vehicle, was liable to defend and indem-
11[ fy the estate of Taira in Longmire's wrongful death action. 
The declaratory relief action was tried by the court with-
u11 l d 1ury The trial court determined that Western Pioneer Insur-
ance 1 ompany provided no coverage for the accident. It further de-
termined that the state was required to provide a defense and to 
indemnify the estate of Taira, holding that the state, as a self-
insured owner of the motor vehicle, owed the same duty to indemnify 
and defend as that owed by an insurance carrier. The State of 
California appealed and the court of appeal reversed. 
Under California Insurance Code Section 11580.l(b), cer-
tain required provisions are set forth which must be included in 
each policy of liability insurance. One of these requirements is 
coverage for "permissive users." 
In California, the obligations arising from a policy of 
insurance do not extend to a self-insurer. Metro U.S. Services, 
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 96 C.A. 3d 678 (1979). 
The respondent in Western Pioneer also argued that the 
state, as employer, was liable under the dual capacity doctrine 
because liability was being imposed upon the state as an insurer, 
rather than an employer. The appellate court reiterated its posi-
t ion that the state's duties as a self-insurer are not the same as 
<111 insui-ei-, and thus the dual capacity doctrine did not apply. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INDEMNIFICA-
1 JON OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES AND GOVERN-
MENTAL IMMUNITY ACTS DO NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the Indem-
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nification of Public Offi('ers i 1d l.!llJ·l•.vees /\ct (Section 63-48-1 
et. seq.), and the Governmenr,d J11u11<1111tv ,\,·t (Section 63-30-1 et 
seq.), do not apply to this case. All hough Lhis was a reserved 
issue of law in the Pretrial C!rckr 'Par.J ll C.), the Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law tail to mention the court'. 
ruling on this issue contained in its Memorandum Decision. 
A. The lndenmification of Public Officers and Employee: 
Pursuant to Section 63-48-3, the County declined to 
Kelly or to pay any compromise, settlement or judgment resulting 
from said personal in jury action. This decision was based on Kelli 
failure to timely tender his defense, cooperate in his defense, 
his grossly negligent conduct which occurred outside the scope of 
his emp1 ''vmenL 
l'he Indemnification Act was analyzed in 1974 Utah Law 
Review 622 as follows: 
"The public entity is not obligated to defend or 
indemnify an officer or employee unless he requests 
a defense in writing within ten days after service 
of process upon him. If the request for defense is 
properly made, the public entity chooses to defend, 
to defend with reservation, or not to defend. If the 
public entity chooses to defend and the officer or 
employee reasonably cooperates in the defense, then 
the public entity is obligated to pay any judgment, 
compromise, or settlement resulting from the suit. 
If the officer or employee does not reasonably coop-
erate, the public entity may terminate the defense 
and pay nothing. If the public entity chooses to 
defend with reservation, it may reserve the right 
not to pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement 
until it is established the claim arose out of 
an act or omission occur Ling "during the performance 
of [the officer's or 1-'mployee's] duties, within the 
scope of his employment, •>r· under color of authority. 
If the public entity choosec; not to defend the of-
ficer or employee may recover from the pubiic entity 
the costs of his defense and any judgment (not a 
compromise or sett l r>rnPnt;, unlJ; if 
la) [h[e establishes that the act or omission upon 
wh i ,. h t he judgment is based occurred during the 
µertormdnce of his duties, within the scope of his 
emµloyment, or under color of authority and that 
he conducted the defense of the claim against him 
irt good faith; and 
(ii) [t]he public entity fails to establish that the 
officer or employee acted or failed to act due to 
gross negligence, fraud, or malice. (§63-48-4(2)] 
If the public entity pays any portion of a judgment 
(not a compromise or settlement) it may recover that 
payment from the officer or employee by establishing 
that he acted or failed to act due to gross negligence, 
fraud, or malice. Otherwise, the officer or employee 
is not liable to indemnify the public entity for 
defense costs or payments made by it as a result of 
any claim made against the public entity or against 
the officer or employee. 
Analysis--Before the enactment of the Indemnifica-
tion Act, the extent to which public officers and 
employees would be personally liable for their 
official actions was often subject to the discre-
tionary power of superiors. The boundaries of 
official immunity are vague and are determined 
according to federal standards in federal courts 
and state standards in state courts. Permissive 
insurance coverage provided by a public entity 
can vary according to budgetary pressures, the 
judgment of those empowered to obtain insurance, 
and the status of the officer or employee. In-
demnification by petition to the Board of Examiners 
and the legislature can be time consuming and dif-
ficult to obtain, inconsistent from case to case, 
and arbitrarily administered, since no standards 
are defined. Under the Indemnification Act, the 
protection from personal liability is comprehensive, 
covering intentional as well as negligent actions; 
mandatory rather than permissive; and 
all officers and employees whatever their position 
ur function ... " 
"The Indemnification Act seems to give broad dis-
' ret1on to the public entity in deciding 
or not Lo defend an officer or employee requesting 
defense, since the Act contains no guide-
[ i ne" or pr ucedural protections." 
rhe County asserted six affirmative defenses under the 
i1:d«rnn1 t [,·ation Act: 
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(1) Failure to properly tender defense within ten days 
(2) Failure to coup1cr,Hc ir1 delense; 
(3) Employee was un a ''trnl ,,, " of his own and not wit 1, 
the course and scope of his erupl 11vnwnl; 
(4) Employee was grossly negligent; 
(5) Employee's defense was not conducted in good faith·, 
and, 
(6) Employee has paid nothing, is under no liability fc 
payment and is therefore not entitled to be indemnified. 
( 1) Utah's Indemnification Statute is an actual loss pL 
The general rule at common law has long been that the ir,. 
demnitee must first pay an obligation before indemnification is 
quired. 42 CJS lndemni ty §14c. Thus, in Cunningham v. Metropolit 
Gov't., 476:; :,'.2d 640 (Tenn. 1972), the court held a city did not 
have to pay a Judgment, under their indemnification statute, agarn 
a police officer who was killed in the accident giving rise to 
suit. The estate was insolvent and no payment to the 
available. The court recognized that the indemnity statutes were 
to protect the employee which, in this case, no longer needed 
tection. 
A close reading of the Indemnification Act supports the 
payment first requirement. There is no mandatory language in S&· 
tion 63-48-3 that the County indemnify any employee except should 
the County conduct his defense. as the County did not 
conduct Kelly's defense, the langucigt· uf Section 63-48-4(1) is th 
only basis for any indemnificati"n That section provides for in 
dernnification once the " .. employ,_.,., pays .inv judgment ... " The in 
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dPmnification plan is, therefore, that if the employee conducts his 
ovm de tens<', the employee will pay his own judgment. Then, after 
the 111dgment is paid, he may be indemnified if it turns out that 
1 !,e 1>rnnty has such an obligation. This approach is entirely con-
si stenl with the literal meaning of indemnification and reflects 
a legislative encouragement that defenses be conducted by the mu-
nicipality involved. 
(2) find that the Indemnification Act 
ic to ie . 
The Indemnification Act is clear, Section 63-48-1 states 
that the purpose of the Act is to protect employees. There is no 
indication that the Act is intended to be an insurance plan whereby 
third parties are paid for torts of the employee. Therefore, absent 
liability, there is no legislative purpose in paying an employee. 
A close reading of the compromise settlement agreement 
shows that Kelly has no liability. The judgment creditors (former 
plaintiffs) have covenanted not to seek recovery from Kelly. It 
is difficult to conceive how the County is obligated to indemnify 
a person that has no liability. 
The law is well-settled that a release of a servant re-
leases the master of liability where the master's alleged tort is 
asserted under respondeat superior. Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, 
In, , 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972). Similarly, the law has long been 
i he! t the re I ease of a debtor releases a surety. Shut tee v. Coalgate 
r;1.11n 1.,, , 172 P. 780 (Okla. 1918). Utah law also follows the com-
lfl(>t1 I <11;· rr1 I e tha l re lase of one tort-feasor releases all tort-
1 ""'-'"'': s un LPss there has been a reservation of rights against the 
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Though this Court has not ruled specifically on whether 
the release of an indemnitPe lhP indemnitor, there is oo 
apparent reason to follow ,1 sepa1a11 ,-ulc from that above. In tJ, 
policies involved make it e,,Pn rn0r e ,1µrir Gpriate to apply the rek 
rule in indemnification because nu protection of the employee is 
needed, which is at the very heart of the purpose of indemnificati 
The reservation of rights in the contract releasing Kell, 
is without meaning. A judgment creditor has no rights in Kelly's 
indemnification. They cannot reserve what they do not have. Ther: 
fore, relieving Kelly of liability relieves the County of any obli, 
gation to indemnify h:un for incurring no loss or liability. 
B. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Section 63-30-7 provides: 
lmmunity from suit of all governmentalentities is 
waived for injury resulting from the negligent 
operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or 
other equipment while in the scope of his employ-
ment. . (emphasis added). 
The plaintiffs initially relied upon the Governmental 
Immunity Act to establish liability and plead in their complaint 
that Kelly was in the course and scope of his duties with Salt Lak, 
County. However, there was no finding of fact that Kelly was witl 
or outside the scope of his employment at the time of the collisio 
Salt Lake County, as a governmental entity, is immune 
from suit for money damages, except as immunity is waived by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act., 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, 
all governmental enti i_ies shal 1 be immune from 
suit for any injury wh11h may result from the 
activities of said entities wherein said entity 
is engaged in the and discharge of a 
governmental function., Section 63-:l0-'3. 
, j 8 
fn this case, since there is no affirmative finding that 
!' ! ,.1ir1L1 t t Ke 11 y was within the course and scope of his employment, 
1 hc- :, f.-,nct,1nt, SaJ t 1.ake County, is under no obligation to indemnify 
1 tic 1,I >111ltff Kelly or his assignees (Foster and Ewing), nor has the 
d'"lt,nd:rnr County waived its immunity from suit. 
This Lmmunity from suit applies equally to any theory of 
tecovery the Court relied upon. Plaintiffs cannot avoid this issue 
by merely claiming that they are not pursuing their action under the 
Governmental Immunity Act. That act made it possible for certain 
aclions to be maintained against governmental entities that were 
formerly immune from suit. Those entities retain immunity against 
suits for injury resulting from the negligent operation by an em-
ployee of a motor vehicle while outside the scope of his employment. 2 
The County asserted Section 63-30-7 as an affirmative de-
fense at tcial, and the Court erred in finding the Act inapplicable. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IS BOUND BY THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEPUTY KELLY. 
A. The judgment obtained by plaintiffs Foster and Ewing 
a ainst laintiff Kell cannot be enforced a ainst 
t e County ecause it was o taine t roug co usion. 
(1) Factual background. The lawsuit against Deputy 
David Mac Kelly (Civil No. C-78-1377) originally included Salt Lake 
c,,unty as a co-defendant under a theory of respondeat superior. 
fhe affidavit of defendant's counsel of July 27, 1979, asserts that 
1"'"1 r y l, 1978, counsel received a telephone call from the 
'"tiff's attorney, Carman E. Kipp. Mr. Kipp indicated that his 
;, ''>'t for the newly-enacted provisions of Section 63-30-29.5 
. l, .. •\ l 'J 'J ., . 
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intention was to secure a judgment against David Mac Kelly and 
pursue his claim against his 's uninsured motorist carrier. 
Upon this representation, the County c1grPed to a voluntary dismis. 
The County did not know, anJ Mr Kipp did not inform opposing coun, 
that on December 12, 1978, the plaint1ff.s had entered into a com· 
promise settlement agreement with David Mac Kelly whereby Kelly 
consented to allow plaintiffs to proceed with a non-jury trial 
wherein Kelly would not contest the issue of negligence and liabil· 
ity. Secondly, Kelly agreed to assign any rights he may have 
against Salt Lake County to the plaintiffs. Thirdly, plaintiffs 
agreed not to execute upon any personal assets of Kelly but insteK 
to pursue their claims against Salt Lake County only. Further, 
the plaintiffs agreed that after two years, or the conclusion of 
any litigacrcn against Salt Lake County, the judgment would be 
released and satisfied against Kelly. 
On January 4, 1979, the County's attorney of record sigm 
a stipulation for an order of dismissal without prejudice. The 
trial was scheduled to begin January 29, 1979, and the County's 
representatives intended to attend. A special trial setting for 
January 5, 1979, was prearranged by plaintiffs' counsel for the 
day following the signing of the stipulation. The County was not 
informed of the trial setting, although it was obviously known of 
prior to January 4, 1979. At that hearing, the plaintiffs present· 
their evidence. Al though Deputy KF 11 v •..i<1 s rep resented by counsel. 
no evidence was presented to rebut c1ny uf the plaintiffs' contentt 
After plaintiffs' closing argument, the Court asked Kell 
attorney, "Do you wish to responcP" Kelly's attorney responded, 
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"l havP no statement." 
No objections were made to any of plaintiffs' evidence. 
:,nnc_ ot the plaintiffs' witnesses were cross-examined. Kelly's 
i urney µresented no evidence to support Kelly's affirmative de-
tenses ,_·ontained in his answer, i.e., comparative negligence of the 
decedent (wearing dark clothing and crossing a heavily-traveled 
streer at night not at a marked pedestrian crossing). The Court 
entered a judgment against Kelly in the amount of $150,000, the 
exact amount prayed for by plaintiffs' counsel. 
(2) Collusion defined. Webster's New Collegiate Die-
tionary, 1977, defines collusion as "secret agreement or cooperation 
for an illegal or deceitful purpose". It defines deceitful as 
"having a tendency or disposition to deceive; a: not honest, b: de-
ceptive, misleading". 
"Collusion" has been judicially defined as: 
" . a corrupt agreement between the parties to 
impose a case on the court, either by the suppres-
sion of evidence or the manufacture thereof, as 
well as an that no defense shall be made." 
(emphasis added). 
In Curb and Gutter District No. 37 v. Parrish, 110 P.2d 
902, 907 (8th Cir. 1940) the Court said: 
"It is generally recognized that collusion in law 
embraces either a fictitious or assumed state of 
facts in order to obtain a judicial determination." 
This is precisely the case now before the Court. The 
plaintiff agreed to secure a judicial determination solely 
f·>t the· purpose of imposing liability on Salt Lake County. Apart 
trc>rn the issue of liability, the factual question of damages was 
-1N, u 297 Mich. 654, 298 N.W. 318, 320 (1941). 
-21-
substantial but remained uncontesLed Dismissing Salt Lake County 
was merely a ploy to avoid oµposit1nn tn the lawsuit. The judgrner 
rendered ($150,000.00) is several times the highest wrongful deaU 
verdict for an unmarried minor child previously rendered in the 
State of Utah. This in itself is an indication that the parties 
based their claim of damages upon a false or assumed state of face 
The result itself fails to sustain good faith. 
The fact that there had been a previous compromise sett!• 
ment agreement between Kelly and the plaintiffs Foster and Ewing 
under the circumstances is evidence of collusion. This evidence 
is strengthened by the fact that the County was not informed of 
the secret stipulation while the County was still a party to the 
lawsuit, nor was it informed of the special non-jury trial date. 
The County was led to believe that plaintiffs' intention was to 
pursue uninsured motorist coverage. The players were merely 
positioned to use the court process to establish an uncontested 
judgment for the sole purpose of imposing it upon the County. 
There can be no doubt that the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the December 12, 1978, compromise settlement agreement, the Januan 
1979, stipulation for voluntary dismissal and the January 5, 1979. 
uncontested non-jury trial and resulting judgment evidence "collu· 
sion" as previously defined. 
B. Non-disclosure as against £Ublic policy. 
Even were this Court to hold as a matter of law that tht 
December 12, 1978, compromise settlement agreement was not 
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. 4 
or unethical conduct, the modern trend of cases hold that pre-trial 
,,vrcncints not to execute made between a plaintiff and one of several 
, le Cendan ts without the knowledge of all the parties to the law-
cui t render the judgment obtained in such action unenforceable. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in Mustang Equipment, Inc. v. 
Welch v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., .564 P.2d 895 
(Ariz. 1977) reasoned that public policy requires immediate disclosure 
of any agreement not to execute between a plaintiff and a co-defendant 
in order "to avoid the inherent tendency to work a fraud on the court 
and to avoid 'collusion' between the plaintiff and some of the de-
fendants". (at p.899). 
In the Mustang case, the unanimous court, in reversing a 
judgment against Mustang, found that even though the non-agreeing 
defendant was not prejudiced at trial by the non-disclosure nor 
would the defense have been conducted differently had the pre-trial 
agreement been disclosed, nevertheless, it held: 
"It has always been the policy of the law to favor 
and encourage the resolution of controversies through 
compromise and settlement rather than through liti-
gation. Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 
( 1962). In the instant case, the disclosure of the 
Welch-Mountain States agreement may have well fos-
tered or encouraged a pre-trial settlement between 
Welch and Mustang. At least, we cannot say that 
Mustang's counsel would not have taken m?re 
positive attitude into settlement negotiations 
had he been aware of the agreement ... " 
!,Rule I 1 Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State 
n.H ',h 11"n 2. An attorney or counselor n?t: (5) Take 
tn deceit r1r collusion, or consent thereto with to deceive 
c1 ('ou1-c or judge or a party to an action or proceeding. 
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"Finally, we think thi:o is i !llalter of public policy. 
While 1-ie rccogni2.e th,:ll unde1- the particular fact 
situation of this cdse was neither fraud, col-
lusion or unethical cc)nduct involved, we cannot 
condone secret a plaintiff and 
defendant whicF by tneir very secretiveness, may 
tend to encourage wrongrtolng and which, at the 
least, may rend to lessen the public's confidence 
in our adversary system." (at p.900). (emphasis 
added). 
C. Covenant not to sue released the county. 
The sipulation between Kelly and plaintiffs Foster and 
Ewing in this case, which they termed a "compromise settlement 
agreement", provided: 
5. Plaintiffs agree and covenant that they will 
not execute against the defendant upon such Judgment 
in any manner or proceeding other than against Salt 
Lake County or any insurance company affording lia-
bility coverage to the defendant at the time and 
place alleged in plaintiffs' first cause of action. 
Tr.e judgment wi 11 be released and satisfied by the 
plaintiffs upon the conclusion or compromise of 
all actions and proceedings against any insurance 
companies and/or Salt Lake County; however, said 
release and satisfaction of said judgment is to 
occur at the end of two years from the date of 
entry of judgment herein, unless at that time 
there is pending in any court of law an action 
by plaintiff against any insurance company or 
Salt Lake County wherein plaintiff alleges that 
said company or Salt Lake County owed a duty to 
indemnify defendant or that it afforded liability 
coverage to the defendant at the time and place 
alleged in the first cause of action of plain-
tiffs' complaint herein, in that event said 
judgment will be released and satisfied upon 
the conclusion or compromise of said pending 
action or actions. (emphasis added) (Record p.14) 
Obviously, in this case, the plaintiffs have no legal 
right to recover dam2ges again0oc Kel J y. Consequently, an ordinar" 
insurance carrier under a standard policy or under an approved 
policy under the Safety Responsibility Act would not be obligated 
to the plaintiffs. (See Huffman ,1. _f_e_ei: 193 S. E.2d 
773 (N.C. 1973). 
fhe Supreme Court of this state has held that a similar 
nut to sue entered into between a plaintiff and a negligent 
1npJ, '"-' «perdtes as a total release of the employer. Holmstead v. 
l>1e'Oel, l_n_'::_., 493 P-2d 625 (Utah 1972). 
In the plaintiff initiated an action against 
the corporate defendant alleging that its employee, while operating 
his motor vehicle within the scope of his employment, negligently 
caused plaintiff injuries. The employee's insurance carrier ob-
Lained a covenant not to sue for a consideration of $10,000, the 
maximum coverage under the employee's policy. The trial court's 
holding that the covenant not to sue operated as a matter of law 
to release the master or principal from liability was affirmed by 
this Court citing the case of Simpson v. Townsley, (CA 10th, 1960), 
283 F.2d 743, with approval, indicating that the "covenant not to 
sue constituted a complete exoneration of the employee and removed 
any foundation upon which to impute negligence to the employer." 
(at p.628). 
Similarly, in this case, former Deputy Kelly is not le-
gally obligated to pay damages to the plaintiffs Foster and Ewing. 
An ordinary insurer would, under the rationale of the Huffman and 
Holmstead cases, therefore, not be obligated to plaintiffs. 
The purpose of requiring an indemnitor to pay only damages 
1 1,_,, r-h" indemni tee would be legally obligated to pay is to prevent 
r ],, ,,_,1-y kind of thing: a collusive agreement between the employee 
1,, 1 • Lhird pdr-ty that is made solely for the purpose of imposing 
Ji_:IJ1]ily on the employer. 
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D. rights in this 
context is :'7'._l_!:d dL1< 1 o 
A stipulated Judgment is d '.·ont ract, not a judicial de 
termination. Owen v. Burn Cowot.r-'-_C<:!_, ';bl P.2d 91 (N.M. 1977); 
49 CJS Judgments §173. Contracts whiLh are injurious to the pub! 
good are void because of public policy. See Spaulding v. Maillet, 
188 P.377 (Mont. 1920). The test of public policy was stated in 
Goldberg v. Sanglier, 616 P.Ld 1239 (Wash. App. 1980) as: 
"The test of public policy is not what the parties 
did or contemplated doing in order to carry out 
their agreement, or even the result of its per-
formance; it is whether the contract as made has 
a "tendency to evil", to be against the public 
good, or to be injurious to the public. At 1247. 
Under the original action of the plaintiffs against Kell 
and the (n•Tty, the defendants were not joint tort feasors. The 
County was joined under a theory of respondeat superior which 
a unity of identity to the two defendants. The relationship of a 
deputy sheriff to the County is more than that of servant and 
master because of the nature of the office. A deputy sheriff is 
not just an employee but a public officer. Pfister v. Niobrara Cc 
557 P.2d 735 (Wyo. 1976). 
The contract leading to a judgment against Kelly withoot 
a defense being required and assigning indemnification rights suft 
from the same policy objections as buying a witness. The promise 
to relieve one of a $1SO,OOO Judgment lends itself to encouraging 
perjury and the perversion of just ice. See Western Cab Co. v. Kt 
523 P.2d 842 (Nev. 197tl) Any public officer defending a 
be open to personal pressurc2 to waive contesting liability in exc 
for cooperation against the indeurn1 tying municipality because of 
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1,,,r ent 1 dl Lo escape personal liability. This clearly is an incentive 
1.,;- 111 '"mployee to commit perjury or at least shade facts. 
nw entering of an unopposed judgment is not the same as 
5etLl1ng a Lawsuit with one tort-feasor in this context because of 
che reL1tionship of the public employee to the County. The County 
may only act through its agents. The relationship with a public 
ofticer is to be always strained if the officer is encouraged to 
turn on the County when its potential liability is only derived from 
that officer. Additionally, if County employees are allowed, as a 
matter of judicial policy, to simply "roll over" to avoid liability, 
there is no practical end to the County's liability exposure. A 
defendant employee could consent to a $10 million judgment as easily 
as one for $150,000. However, if these types of contracts are voided, 
the Indemnification Act would protect the cooperating employee ul-
timately and limit his exposure to that which the law intended. 
Another basis for avoiding the assignment of indemnifica-
tion rights is the appearance of collusion which could corrupt the 
process of justice. Kelly's current counsel is the same one that 
11 
1 • : I 
rep re sen ts the judgment creditors. The switching of sides is complete. ' 
The assignments encourage, and make easy, an extreme perversion of 
i us r L ce. A public employee has everything to gain by making a deal 
ei Lher· formally or informally to enter a consent judgment, assign 
l n 1 f i c c1 c ion rights, and take a percentage of the recovery· 
11, 'r •. ,.,y. Lhe employee not only avoids liability but even profits 
fhis tendency to evil should be stopped now as a 
'"·"I ' ot public policy. 
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In summary, the assignment hy Ke 11 Y to the original pla1, 
tiffs should be voided on f'ubli<' f>''l1cv grounds because (1) it brc 
the public trust by injuring the re Lat L<lnship between the County 
and its officers, (2) perjury and pervero,ion of justice are encour 
aged, and (3) the appearance of collusion encourages arrangements 
which work against the very policy of tort law. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING JUDGMENT WHICH 
PROVIDES FOR ACCUMULATED INTEREST ON A $150,000 
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST PLAINTIFF KELLY IN THE 
ORIGINAL TORT ACTION (CIVIL NO. C-78-1377) AND 
COSTS OF DEFENSE, ETC. 
The trial court's Amended Finding of Fact No. 2 states: 
"2. That as a self-insurer the County was obligated to 
provide indemnity in accordance with the financial responsibility 
limit provided by statute in the sum of $15,000.00 and to 
the usual related cover age and benefits customary in the insurance 
industry, including paying costs of defense for David Mac 
paying interest on the entire judgment amount of $150, 000. 00, plus 
costs, until the indemnity limit of $15,000.00 was paid; (emphasis 
added). 
A. "Usual Related Coverage and Benefits". 
The County formally objected to similar language set for 
in the original findings of fact based upon the trial court's find, 
ing that no contract of insurance existed, To hold self-insuren 
to some amorphous "usual related c:overagt> and benefits customary 
in the insurance industry" standard is inconceivable and totally 
without authority, statutory or decisional. 
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B. Attorneys Fees. 
The law in Utah is well-settled that no obligation gener-
-<i ly PXi.c;t.s for a party to pay another party's attorney's fees in 
I 1tigat ton unless such obligation is created by contract or statute. 
Stubbs v Heuunert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977); Walker v. Sandwick, 
P.2d 1273 (Utah 1976). 
The duty of an insurance company to defend its insured 
arises out of the policy of insurance - not out of the Safety Re-
sponsibility Act. Since there was a finding that no insurance 
policy existed in this case, and there is no statutory requirement 
to defend an insured, the Court's finding of fact is in error. 
C. Costs and Fees. 
The awarding of costs and fees in a declaratory judgment 
action is governed by Section 78-33-10. That section authorizes 
the court to award costs as is equitable. In Western Cas. & Sur. 
Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980), this court indicated the 
standard to be applied is that each party is to assume their own 
costs unless incurred pursuant to litigation conducted in bad faith. 
The mere existence of a justifiable controversy is insufficient to 
assess costs. 
D. Interest. 
Judgment in this action was made and entered against Salt 
1.ake County on January 31, 1983, for the sum of $15,000.00. Interest 
011 ·,uhiecL Judgment is accruing at the rate of 12% per annum (Sec-
' l •, ll I 0) - I - 1, ) 
Plaintiffs were successful in persuading the trial court 
t<> gr.mt judgment against Salt Lake County to (1) provide indemnity 
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in the amount of $15,000.00; (2) reimburse costs of defense and 
court costs incurred in C1,,;1 r·dse '-78-1377; and (3) pay 
interest at the statutory rate on :,L')(J,000.00 until subject judgn1, 
is satisfied. 
The general rule is that a contract of indemnity impliea 
by law in favor of one who is 1 egally liable for the negligence 01 
another covers loss or damage and not liability. 5 Therefore, as 
in the case of contracts of indemnity against damage, a cause of 
action for indemnity based on tort does not accrue until the indem· 
nitee has suffered an actual loss. 6 
In this action, plaintiff Kelly has not experienced u 
actual loss. His attorney's fees incurred in defending the 
tort action (Civil Case No. C-78-1377) were paid by Farmer's Insur· 
ance Excki:-,ge - the liability carrier for his privately-owned ve· 
hicle - and that action has since been resolved (Supreme 
No. 19052). 
Since plaintiff Kelly has not suffered an actual 
would not be entitled to any rights of indemnification under the 
Indemnification Act 7 nor under an implied in law indemnification 
requirement. 
Plaintiffs' counsel offered no statutory or decisional 
law that would support the trial court's judgment holding the appe 
lant liable for paying interest on a judgment not entered against 
41 AmJur2d, INDEMNI!'Y §32; Du11r1 11 !Jr·alde Asphalt Paving Co., 
175 NY 214, 67 NE 439 --------- - -
6Ibid. 
7
42 CJS Indemnity §14 c; Cunni_r1gham_v_._l!etropolitan Gov't, 476 
S.W.2d 640 (Tenn. 1972) 
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l he C '"int y and for an amount ten times the sum the appellant could 
, y bP dccountable for. Since the appellant cannot find any 
1"1h,H1ty, whatsoever, that would support the judgment rendered 
11 ere rn . i t '' i 11 await the respondent's brief in order to respond to 
this of the trial court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
As the owner of the vehicle involved in the collision 
g1v1ng rise to this suit, the appellant admits liability under the 
No-fault Act. The County has a certificate of self-insurance under 
lhe No-Fault Act and has in fact paid to plaintiffs Foster and Ewing 
all sums due under that act, 
The appellant maintains that it is not subject to the 
µrovisions of the Safety Responsibility Act by specific reference 
(Section 63-48-33); that equivalent security under the No-Fault Act 
(Section 31-41-5) does not mean "identical" security, for there 
would then be no differentiation between the two methods of providing 
security, thus giving no meaning to that section; and that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Allstate v. USF&G applies only to insurance 
policies issued as security under the No-Fault Act. 
This approach is entirely consistent with a public policy 
thac still provides the taxpayers' governing entities limited im-
rnu111Ly from suit; the public policy which grants governing entities 
the authority only to insure their employees against liability for 
'" i 11ry r•,su Lt ing from a negligent act or omission in the scope of 
1 1., ', (Section 63-30-33); and the long-standing public 
1"'11'\' tl1al a tort-feasor should be responsible for his own mis-
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Plaintiffs take a novel apr,rn.ich to their claim for re-
covery. They attempt to .i·oid rhP lim1talions of the lndemnific: 
and Goverrunental Immunity Ac rs by m,iinL,iining Kelly was merely a 
permissive user of the Counly's car They claim that permission 1 
drive the automobile is the unly r<:>levant factor, thus urging thi: 
Court to judicially inval i.date those statutes in every personal in 
jury case involving automobiles. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court shou)j 
be reversed as a result of the plaintiffs' compromise settlement 
agreement of December 12 , 197 8, for the reasons previously discuss· 
Public policy would dictate a reversal in this case in order to d; 
courage similar secret agreements being reached which would 
the public's confidence in our adversary system and 
ter collus1'e 
The trial court's judgment awarding accumulated interest 
on an amount tenfold the judgment rendered is an anomaly that must 
be reserved for analysis in appellant's reply brief. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of July, 1983. 
TED CANNON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
nty Attorney 
for Defendant-Appe; 
CERTIFICATE _Qf _ _12_ELIVERY 
I certify that two copie:o ot the toregoing Brief of App: 
lants were personally delivered Lo Carmen F:. Kipp, KIPP & CHRISTI 
\t t fur Respondents, 600 Commercial Club Building, Salt Lake 
r 1 1,7 lfL<1h, thi::; l11th day of July, 1983. 
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